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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FREEDOM OF SPEECH, 
EXPRESSION: PROTECTING MAIN STREET? 
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT ANALYZES 
WHETHER AN ORDINANCE REGULATING EXOTIC 
DANCING AND ADULT ENTERTAINMENT VIOLATES FREE 
SPEECH AND CONSTITUTES A REGULATORY TAKING 
McCrothers Corp. v. City of Mandan, 2007 ND 28, 728 N.W.2D 124 
I. FACTS 
Two bars, the Tree City Bar and Silver Dollar Bar, were located on 
Main Street in Mandan, North Dakota.1  The bars, owned and operated by 
McCrothers Corporation and Luke Berger, offered exotic dancing for four-
teen and twenty-two years, respectively.2  In 2003, David Moos expressed 
interest in opening another adult themed business on Main Street in the 
vicinity of the other two establishments.3 
Since 1979, Mandan has had an ordinance in place which prohibits 
nude dancing in establishments that serve alcohol.4  In June of 2003, subse-
quent to the rumors of a new establishment on Main Street, the Mandan 
Board of City Commissioners adopted new city ordinances to regulate the 
zoning of cabaret establishments.5  The commissioners modeled the ordi-
nances after the ordinance upheld by the North Dakota Supreme Court in 
Olson v. City of West Fargo6 in 1981.7  Mandan Ordinance No. 961 pro-
hibited alcoholic beverage licensees from providing adult entertainment for 
more than one day of the week without obtaining a cabaret license.8  
 
1. McCrothers Corp. v. City of Mandan, 2007 ND 28, ¶ 5, 728 N.W.2d 124, 127. 
2. Id.  
3. Brief for Appellant at ¶ 17, McCrothers, 2007 ND 28, 728 N.W.2d 124 (No. 20060127). 
4. McCrothers, ¶ 2, 728 N.W.2d at 126 (citing MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-
01-18(2)(d) (1994)). 
5. Id. 
6. 305 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1981). 
7. McCrothers, ¶ 2, 728 N.W.2d at 126 (citing Olson, 305 N.W.2d at 831). 
8. Id. (citing MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-01-18 (2003)).  Ordinance No. 
961 states in part: 
2.  No alcohol beverage licensee under this title shall permit entertainment for more 
than one day a week any given week without first having obtained a cabaret license as 
hereinafter provided. . . .  5.  No live performances are permitted on an alcoholic 
beverage licensed premise which contains any form of dancing.  Such prohibition of 
dancing does not include the incidental movement or choreography of singers or musi-
cians which are made in connection with their singing or playing of a musical instru-
ment, provided the dancing does not include the acts prohibited under this section.  
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Ordinance No. 962 created a moratorium on new adult cabaret licenses.9  
Additionally, Ordinance No. 963 declared the purpose for regulating adult 
entertainment establishments and defined adult cabaret entertainment.10  It 
also provided for a two year period for nonconforming uses.11  Ordinance 
No. 964 declared the purposes of regulating adult entertainment and the 
standards of conduct for the adult establishments and the revocation of 
licenses.12  Under the definition of adult entertainment, the entertainment 
 
This restriction applies to all alcoholic beverage licensed premises whether or not they 
have a cabaret license. . . .  6.  No live performances are permitted on an alcoholic 
beverage licensed premise which involve the removal of clothing, garments or any 
other costume. 
Id. 
9. McCrothers, ¶ 2, 728 N.W.2d at 126 (citing MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-
01-18.  Ordinance No. 962 states: “An Ordinance to establish a moratorium for issuance of cabaret 
licenses or certificates of occupancy for any building or structure which use meets the definition 
of adult cabaret entertainment.”  MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-01-18. 
10. McCrothers, ¶ 3, 728 N.W.2d at 126 (citing MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 12-01-18.  Ordinance No. 963 states in part: 
1.  Amends the current zoning provision relating to adult establishments to include 
more definitions of adult uses, namely: adult arcades, adult cabaret entertainment, 
specified sexual activities; adult uses-accessory; adult uses—principal; adult uses body 
painting studio; adult use—bookstore; adult use—companionship establishment; adult 
use—health/sport club; adult use—hotel/motel; adult use—massage parlor; adult 
use—modeling studio; adult use—motion picture arcade; adult use—novelty business; 
adult use—sauna; adult use—steam room/bathhouse facility. . . .  2.  Amends the 
current definitions of adult uses and the new uses by including a more objective 
standard, namely, a use which excludes minors by virtue of age and use, depiction of 
activity which is distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on specified sexual 
activities or specified anatomical areas. 
MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-01-18 (2003).  “Adult business,” “adult entertain-
ment,” “adult establishments,” and “adult cabarets” are terms of art, and one should look to the 
individual ordinance to see each definition.  See generally id.  (defining adult establishments as 
arcades, cabaret, and sexual activities); MINOT, N.D ORDINANCE art. 3, div. 2, § 18-190 (2008) 
(defining an adult cabaret as an establishment that features go-go dancers, exotic dancers, 
strippers, or similar entertainers); GRAND FORKS, N.D., CITY CODE, ch. 18-0204  (2008) (defining 
an adult bookstore as an enclosed structure housing materials that emphasize sexual activities and 
excludes minors; adult cabarets, as those featuring go-go dancers, exotic dancers, strippers, adult 
cinema as that which includes a projection of specified sexual activities; and adult entertainment 
as any of the previously mentioned or a combination).  One adult entertainment attorney describes 
the adult entertainment industry as, “erotic entertainment in every medium from the Internet to 
prerecorded DVDs to magazines to gentlemen’s clubs (nee ‘strip joints’), but includes every other 
medium that conveys either ‘erotica’ or ‘sleaze,’ depending on your view of such things.”  Clyde 
DeWitt, Representing the Adult Entertainment Industry, 22 WTR ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 1 (2005). 
11. McCrothers, ¶ 3, 728 N.W.2d at 126 (citing MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 12-01-18. 
12.  Id. ¶ 4, 728 N.W.2d at 126-27.  Ordinance No. 964 states: 
1.  Purpose: It is the purpose of this ordinance to regulate adult entertainment 
establishments in order to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the 
citizens of the City, and to establish reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the 
delirious secondary effects and concentrations of adult entertainment establishments 
within the City.  The provisions of this ordinance have neither the purpose nor effect 
of imposing a limitation or restriction on the content or reasonable access to any 
communicative materials, including sexual oriented materials.  Similarly, it is neither 
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offered at both bars fell within the provisions of these ordinances.13  As 
such, if the bars desired to continue offering adult entertainment, it was nec-
essary to stop serving alcohol, obtain a cabaret license, and relocate to an 
appropriately zoned area.14 
In June 2005, McCrothers and Berger brought separate actions to en-
join the enforcement of the ordinances.15  They alleged a taking of property 
under article I, section twelve of the North Dakota Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.16  The district court 
issued orders to show cause, and McCrothers and Berger consolidated the 
actions.17  The court vacated a temporary injunction due to lack of cause 
shown.18  The injunction was effective September 9, 2005.19 
On October 4, 2005, the court granted a motion to amend the com-
plaints.20  McCrothers and Berger additionally alleged that the ordinances 
violated freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment to the United 
 
the intent nor effect of this ordinance to restrict or deny access by adults to sexually 
oriented materials protected by the First Amendment, or to deny access by the 
distributors and exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to their intended market.  
Neither is it the intent nor effect of this ordinance to condone or legitimize the 
distribution of obscene material. . . .  Definitions: “Adult Cabaret” means any com-
mercial premises or private club. . . .  “Adult Entertainment” means: 1. Any exhibi-
tion, performance or dance of any type conducted in any premise where such 
exhibition, performance, or dance involves a person(s) who performs in such clothing 
or sheds clothing to a point where the area below the top to the bottom of the areola of 
a female breast or any portion of pubic area, anus, buttocks, vulva or genitals are 
covered by opaque material, or wearing any device or covering exposed to view which 
simulates the appearance of any portion of the female breast below the top of the 
areola or any portion of the pubic region, anus, buttocks, vulva or genitals, or human 
genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely or opaquely covered; or 2.  
Any exhibition, performance or dance which includes any of the following: . . . . d. 
Appearances, entertainment or performances of any type consisting of or containing 
any nude performer, or topless female dancer.  (1)  “nude performer” or “nude dancer” 
means any person who performs in attire such that any portion of the pubic area, anus, 
vulva or genitals is exposed to view or not covered with an opaque material.  (2) 
“Topless female performer” or [“]topless female dancer” means any female who 
performs or appears in attire such that any portion of her breasts below the top of the 
areola is exposed to view or not covered with an opaque material. 
MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-02.1-01, 02. 
13. Transcript of Trial, McCrothers Corp. v. City of Mandan, No. 30-05-C-0435 at 3-4 
(Morton Co. Mar. 14, 2006) (“Although no evidence was offered as to the precise nature of the 
dancing entertainment that was offered at both the Silver Dollar Bar and the Tree City Bar, it 
appears it would be classified as adult entertainment.”). 
14. McCrothers, ¶ 5, 728 N.W.2d at 127.  
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States Constitution.21  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment.22  Both parties stipulated that the issues regarding Ordinance No. 962 
were moot.23  The district court granted the City of Mandan’s motion and 
dismissed the complaints after oral arguments.24  McCrothers and Berger 
appealed from the judgment.25  The North Dakota Supreme Court heard the 
case on March 17, 2007 and affirmed the district court’s ruling.26  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court held that the ordinances did not violate the 
First or Fifth Amendments.27 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Adult entertainment cases are complex.28  The United States Supreme 
Court has not produced a majority rationale in these cases.29  In order to 
understand the adult entertainment jurisprudence, it is useful to begin with 
the basic, constitutional framework.30  The next section addresses the power 
to regulate adult businesses through local ordinances and zoning.31  Then, it 
is beneficial to analyze whether “adult” expressive conduct, like nude 
dancing, is classified as obscenity or protected expression.32  Next, it is 
necessary to focus on the regulations of symbolic conduct under the First 
Amendment.33  After the basic tests are established, the next section 
 
21. Id. 
22. Id.  McCrothers and Berger argued that the City was regulating speech illegally because 
it did not study the effects of the establishments on the neighborhoods in Mandan.  Transcript of 
Trial, supra note 12, at 13-14.  Additionally, McCrothers and Berger argued that the ordinances 
constituted a taking because the ordinances denied them the opportunity to provide adult 
entertainment and the income diminished for both establishments.  Id. at 17-18.  The City of 
Mandan argued that there were no issues of fact and, therefore, the ordinances were constitutional 
under both the First and Fifth Amendments.  Id. at 22-23. 
23. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, ¶ 4. 
24. McCrothers, ¶ 6, 728 N.W.2d at 127. 
25. Id., ¶ 1, 728 N.W.2d at 126.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. ¶¶ 32, 35, 728 N.W.2d at 140-41. 
28. See Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2003) (“While 
the question presented is rather straightforward, the issue is significantly complicated by a long 
series of Supreme Court decisions involving the application of the First Amendment in the adult 
entertainment context.”). 
29. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429 (2002) 
(plurality opinion) (producing two different rationales for analyzing a zoning ordinance); City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282 (2000) (plurality opinion) (producing a splintered rationale 
analyzing a general nudity ordinance). 
30. See discussion infra Part II.A (providing the basic foundation of the First and Fifth 
Amendments). 
31. See discussion infra Part II.B (addressing the power to enact ordinances). 
32. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing whether adult entertainment constitutes 
obscenity). 
33. See discussion infra Part II.D (focusing on the three tests used to analyze symbolic 
conduct: content-neutral, content-based, and secondary effects). 
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discusses the development of the constitutional doctrines regulating speech 
beginning with the Twenty-First Amendment.34  After establishing relevant 
Twenty-First Amendment case law, it is useful to address the development 
of the First Amendment regulation of adult businesses.35  Finally, adult 
entertainment challenges are discussed under the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause.36 
A. BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: THE FIRST AND FIFTH 
AMENDMENTS 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances.”37  The United States 
Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech is a fundamental right that 
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.38  The First Amendment protects more than the written or spo-
ken word; it also protects expressive conduct.39  Even though expressive 
conduct is protected, the government has a “freer hand” in regulating it.40  
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that nude dancing is 
protected expressive conduct.41  The free speech provision of the North 
Dakota Constitution similarly provides: “Every man may freely write, 
speak and publish his opinions on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that privilege.”42 
The constitutionality of nude dancing ordinances has also been 
challenged under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause when adult 
 
34. See discussion infra Part II.E (analyzing the development of case law utilizing the 
Twenty-First Amendment analysis of adult entertainment). 
35. See discussion infra Part II.F (providing the development of First Amendment analysis of 
adult entertainment ordinances). 
36. See discussion infra Part II.G (analyzing the development of challenges under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
38. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
39. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (stating that the First Amendment literally 
only forbids the abridgment of “speech,” but the Court has long recognized that its protection does 
not end at the spoken or written word). 
40. Id. at 406. 
41. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that some nude dancing is expressive conduct within the “outer perimeters” of the First 
Amendment). 
42. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
        
500 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:495 
businesses allege an ordinance has taken the business’s ability to operate.43  
An ordinance may be a taking if it deprives the landowner of all reasonable 
uses of the property.44  The Takings Clause states that “private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”45  Like the 
First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.46  The North Dakota Constitution also has a tak-
ings provision which states, “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation.”47  In addition to basic 
constitutional issues, adult entertainment cases regularly involve municipal 
ordinances.48  Therefore, a brief overview of ordinances and zoning is 
provided.49 
B. THE POWER TO REGULATE ADULT BUSINESSES THROUGH LOCAL 
ORDINANCES AND ZONING 
An ordinance is a local law passed by a municipality that has the power 
to regulate its affairs.50  Ordinances have a presumption of validity.51  
Moreover, ordinances may impose more stringent regulations than the state 
legislatures, as long as the two do not conflict.52  The proliferation of adult 
businesses is often viewed as a danger to property values.53  As a result, 
 
43. See, e.g., SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
a nude dancing  zoning ordinance did not constitute a taking within the Fifth Amendment). 
44. Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, ¶ 17, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856.  
An ordinance will not be a taking if it lessens or does not allow the best use of the property.  Id. 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
46. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 n.1 (2002) (citing Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 
266, 239 (1897)) (finding that the Takings Clause applies to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
47. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
48. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986) (upholding a 
municipal zoning ordinance that regulated the location of adult movie theaters). 
49. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing regulation through ordinances and zoning). 
50. See City of Detroit v. Detroit United Ry., 184 N.W. 516, 518-19 (Mich. 1921) (finding 
that local authorities may control street use as long as it is not inconsistent with state law). 
51. Tower Realty, Inc. v. City of East Detroit, 196 F.2d 710, 718 (6th Cir. 1952). 
52. See, e.g., Anchor Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Equal Opportunities Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 234, 
237 (Wis. 1984) (finding that a city could regulate through its home rule powers even though there 
was a statewide concern).  Historically, home rule powers enabled a municipality to exercise 
powers in areas where the state legislature had not acted.  See, e.g., In re Condemnation of Blocks 
13, 14, and 15, Koehler’s Subdivision, City of Grand Island, 12 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Neb. 1943) 
(holding that a property statute was a state interest).  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
determined that home-rule authority must be granted by the North Dakota Legislature.  Litten v. 
City of Fargo, 294 N.W.2d 628, 631 (N.D. 1980). 
53. Dana M. Tucker, Comment, Preventing the Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment 
Establishments: Is Zoning the Solution?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 383, 384 (1997). 
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communities often enact zoning ordinances to provide control and orderly 
development of land within a neighborhood and community.54 
The first United States Supreme Court case to affirm the government’s 
zoning power is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,55 which analyzed 
the validity of a zoning ordinance.56  In Euclid, a landowner challenged an 
ordinance that limited his ability to sell his land.57  The land in question was 
originally classified as industrial.58  After the ordinance was enacted, the 
land was zoned as residential.59  The landowner alleged that this classifica-
tion would lower his profit by $100 per front foot.60  The Court rejected this 
challenge and found that the landowner had not been deprived of due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment because the municipality had 
broad police powers that could be used in such circumstances to regulate 
the orderly growth of a municipality.61  Additionally, the Court stated that 
regulation cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable.62  Rather, it has to have a 
substantial relation to public health, safety, and morals, or general welfare 
in order to qualify as constitutional.63 
Although Euclid provides the default zoning standard, courts do not 
apply the deferential Euclid standard when the First Amendment is impli-
cated.64  Instead, courts rely on the First Amendment.65  Thus, zoning 
ordinances are often analyzed under the First Amendment.66  Therefore, it is 
beneficial to review the First Amendment tests and case law regulating 
adult business ordinances.67 
 
54. Ahearn v. Town of Wheatland, 2002 WY 12, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d 409, 414. 
55. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
56. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397 (holding that the ordinance, which established a plan for 
regulating the location of industries, businesses, the height of buildings, and the size of lots, was a 
valid exercise of power). 




61. Id. at 397. 
62. Id. at 395. 
63. Id. 
64. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1981) (analyzing a 
zoning ordinance under the First Amendment because the ordinance restricted speech on 
billboards). 
65. Id. 
66. Matthew L. McGinnis, Note, Sex, But Not the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, the 
First Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 625 (2005).  
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (upholding a zoning 
ordinance under the secondary effects First Amendment test). 
67. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing whether adult entertainment is obscenity or 
protected expressive speech). 
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C. CLASSIFYING WHETHER ADULT ENTERTAINMENT IS OBSCENITY 
OR PROTECTED FIRST AMENDMENT EXPRESSION 
The Supreme Court has not extended First Amendment protection to 
obscene speech.68  Adult entertainment presents a unique challenge because 
it invokes moral, religious, and First Amendment responses. 69  Even though 
nude dancing and similar non-pornographic adult entertainment have been 
held to be protected speech, the Supreme Court’s adult entertainment deci-
sions have been fractured.70  Therefore, in order to understand whether the 
expression is obscenity, it is first necessary to review the history of the 
obscenity doctrine.71  Then, it is beneficial to address the development of 
the modern obscenity doctrine.72 
1. History of Obscenity Doctrines That Regulated Adult 
Businesses 
Adult businesses were first regulated through obscenity laws.73  The 
common law offense of obscenity was first recognized in Great Britain in 
 
68. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categorically 
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”). 
69. See Karen Cynn, Casenote, City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.: Are We Losing the 
First Amendment, or Just Adult Businesses?, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 227, 228-29 n.14 
(2005) (explaining that organizations, such as the First Amendment Lawyers Association of 
America, Publishers and the National League of Cities filed amici curiae briefs in support of and 
in opposition to an adult bookstore ordinance). 
70. See, e.g., Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he issue is significantly complicated by a long series of Supreme Court decisions involving 
the application of the First Amendment in the adult entertainment context.”).  The jurisprudence 
consists of a number of plurality opinions based on different rationales that have caused 
difficulties for courts analyzing whether regulations violate the First Amendment.  See, e.g., 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (plurality opinion) (finding that a zoning 
ordinance was constitutional using three rationales).  At least one justice has stated that many of 
the adult ordinances should not be analyzed under First Amendment analysis.  See City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 307-10 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the First 
Amendment should only be utilized if the ordinance is aimed only at the communicative nature of 
the action).  Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, noted that: 
In Barnes, I voted to uphold the challenged Indiana statute “not because it survives 
some lower level of First Amendment scrutiny . . . but because it is not subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny at all.”  . . . The traditional power of government to foster good 
morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of the traditional judgment (if Erie wishes 
to endorse it) that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by the 
First Amendment. 
Id. 
71. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (reviewing the history of the obscenity doctrine). 
72. See discussion infra Part II.C.2 (explaining modern obscenity standards). 
73. Bryant Paul et al., Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning and 
Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 355, 357 (2001). 
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1727.74  In 1815, a United States court heard an obscenity case.75  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that any offense “may be punishable, if 
in its nature and by its example, it tends to the corruption of morals.”76 
2. Modern Development of the Obscenity Doctrine 
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court held in Roth v. United 
States77 that obscene material was not protected by the First Amendment.78  
This test is referred to as the Roth test.79  The obscenity doctrine continued 
to develop in the 1960s.80  In 1970, the United States Presidential Commis-
sion on Obscenity and Pornography found no harmful effects from sexually 
explicit materials and recommended legalization of all forms of sexually 
explicit communication.81 
The United States Supreme Court case, Miller v. California,82 provided 
the modern standard for obscenity in 1973.83  Miller violated California 
obscenity laws when he mailed sexually explicit brochures that contained 
graphic sexual materials.84  The Court vacated Miller’s conviction and de-
veloped a test for determining obscenity.85  This test applied to “hard-core” 
 
74. Dominus Rex v. Curll, 2 Str. 789, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).  A publisher was convicted 
of obscenity when he published Venus in the Cloister, or the Nun in Her Smock, an “intemperate 
dialogue about lesbian love in a convent.”  FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 5 
(The Bureau of Nat’l Affairs 1976). 
75. See Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 1815 WL 1297 at *7 (Pa. Dec. 1815) (involving a case 
where six men were convicted of displaying a painting of a man in an improper position with a 
woman). 
76. Id. 
77. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
78. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89 (finding that obscene material is defined as material that 
“appeal[s] to a prurient interest” in sex, that is presented in a patently offensive way). 
79. Paul et al., supra note 73, at 357-58. 
80. See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689-90 (1959) (holding 
that a film based on Lady Chatterley’s Lover was protected by the First Amendment); Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966) (opining that obscene materials must be without socially 
redeeming value). 
81. See generally COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 23-27, 51-64 (1970)) (discussing a program 
used to determine the effects of explicit sexual materials, which resulted in a recommendation of 
legislative action). 
82. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
83. Miller, 413 U.S. at 36-37; see also Michael J. Mazurczak, An Assessment of the Value 
Inquiry of the Obscenity Test, 76 ILL. B.J. 512, 513 (1988) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
agreed that Miller would be utilized to analyze obscenity). 
84. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.  The brochures included advertisements for the books “Inter-
course,” “Man-Woman,” “Sex-Orgies Illustrated,” “An Illustrated History of Pornography,” and a 
film, “Marital Intercourse,” as well as pictures depicting men and women engaged in sexually 
explicit activities.  Id. 
85. Id. at 24-25.  The test provides: 
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
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pornography.86  After the Court’s decision in Miller, adult entertainment, 
with the exception of certain forms of pornography, has been protected by 
the First Amendment.87  It is therefore necessary to review the standards for 
symbolic conduct under the First Amendment.88 
D. REGULATIONS OF SYMBOLIC CONDUCT UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Because most adult entertainment does not constitute obscenity, it is 
typically analyzed under the Supreme Court’s standards for expressive 
conduct.89  The United States Supreme Court began its modern analysis of 
First Amendment conduct during the Vietnam War.90  At that time, courts 
addressed the constitutionality of war protests.91  In Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley,92 the Court found “above all else, the First Amendment 
means that [the] government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”93  Two years later in 
Spence v. Washington,94 the Court established a standard for expressive 
speech.95  Expressive speech must be communicative and convey a particu-
larized message that those present would be able to understand.96  If the 
conduct is expressive speech, the courts must then determine whether the 
 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and, (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
86. Id. at 27. 
87. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(“[N]ude dancing . . . is expressive conduct with the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, 
though we view it as only marginally so.”). 
88. See discussion infra Part II.D (analyzing the regulations of symbolic conduct under the 
First Amendment). 
89. See generally Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertain-
ment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 453-59 (2004) (explaining that the standards for 
expressive conduct are: (1) content-neutral, where the ordinance restricts speech without any 
intention to restrict a message; (2) content-based, where the ordinance restricts speech due to its 
message; and (3) secondary effects, where the ordinance’s focus is the business’ effects on the 
surrounding community). 
90. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1972) (holding that an ordinance 
prohibiting picketing in front of schools was unconstitutional). 
91. See id. (analyzing a picketing ordinance in 1972); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
367, 369-72 (1968) (upholding a statute that prohibited burning draft cards). 
92. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
93. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
94. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
95. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
96. Id.  The courts’ analyses tend to focus not on whether the conduct is expressive, but 
whether it is content-neutral or content-based.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-07 
(1989) (finding that the conduct was expressive and then analyzing the content-neutral and 
content-based distinctions). 
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ordinance is content-based, content-neutral, and whether the secondary 
effects doctrine applies.97  Additionally, the courts analyze ordinances to 
determine whether they meet the standard for overbreadth.98 
1. Expressive Speech Tests: Content-Based, Content-Neutral, 
and Secondary Effects 
Even though the Supreme Court has not provided clear guidelines for 
the distinction between content-neutral and content-based laws, one scholar 
categorized it as, “whether the regulation is ‘aim[ed] at ideas of informa-
tion,’ or . . . whether the regulation is aimed at the communicative im-
pact.”99  Under this analysis, a content-neutral regulation is aimed at the 
“noncommunicative” impact of speech, while the content-based regulation 
is aimed at the “communicative impact” of the speech.100  In order to under-
stand what level of scrutiny the court will utilize, it is necessary to review 
the content-based, content-neutral, and secondary effects tests.101 
a. Content-based Test 
A content-based regulation is aimed at the subject of the speech, or the 
suppression of expression, and is analyzed under a strict scrutiny stan-
dard.102  This standard is almost always fatal.103  The government is prohib-
ited from restricting speech unless it can meet the strict scrutiny standard.104  
Therefore, courts presume these regulations are invalid.105  In Texas v. 
Johnson,106 the United States Supreme Court held that burning the Ameri-
can flag was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.107  
Therefore, a statute prohibiting flag burning failed the higher strict scrutiny 
test for content-based regulations because it was aimed at the suppression of 
 
97. See discussion infra Part II.D.1 (explaining the standards for the three expressive speech  
tests). 
98. See discussion infra Part II.D.2 (addressing the overbreadth doctrine). 
99. Ofer Raban, Content-Based, Secondary Effects, and Expressive Conduct: What in the 
World Do They Mean (and What Do They Mean to the United States Supreme Court)?, 30 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 551, 554 (2000) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 12-2, at 789-90 (2d ed. 1988)). 
100. Id. 
101. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.a-c (reviewing three expressive speech tests). 
102. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989).  The strict scrutiny standard requires the 
state to have a compelling interest and the interest must be narrowly tailored to accomplish that 
goal.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 405 (1992). 
103. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992). 
104. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
105. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. 
106. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
107. Texas, 491 U.S. at 420. 
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expression.108  Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals found that it is 
the motive of the legislature, not an individual legislator that is determina-
tive when analyzing intent.109  If the court finds that the ordinance is not 
aimed at the subject of the speech, then the court will move to the content-
neutral test.110 
b. Content-Neutral Tests: O’Brien and Ward 
A content-neutral regulation is unrelated to the subject of the speech 
and is judged by a lesser standard—intermediate scrutiny.111  Under this 
standard, the regulations are generally permitted as long as they do not 
interfere with the message of the speech and leave alternate channels for 
communication.112  The government can restrict expression in time, place, 
or manner, as long as these regulations are content-neutral.113 
In United States v. O’Brien,114 the United States Supreme Court 
developed the primary content-neutral test when David O’Brien burned his 
Selective Service registration certificate in protest of the Vietnam War.115  
O’Brien argued that this act was symbolic speech protected by the First 
Amendment.116  The Court rejected this argument in order to prevent a 
“limitless variety of conduct” from being categorized as protected 
speech.117  The Court established a test that government regulations must 
satisfy in order to retain constitutionality when regulating expressive con-
duct: (1) the regulation must further an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest; (2) the governmental interest must be unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and (3) the restriction on the alleged First 
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
 
108. Stringfellows of N.Y., Ltd. v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d 382, 399 (N.Y. 1998).  In 
Stringfellows, individual legislators indicated that their intention was to suppress protected 
expression.  Id.  Even so, the court refused to invalidate a municipal zoning ordinance regulating 
adult business locations based on intent of the individuals.  Id. at 406. 
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (utilizing the 
content-neutral standard to analyze a municipal ordinance). 
111. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-96 (1984). 
112. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
113. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 244 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
114. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
115. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70. 
116. Id. at 376. 
117. Id. 
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of that interest.118  This test is still applied in modern jurisprudence to 
symbolic conduct.119 
The United States Supreme Court also developed a similar doctrine to 
determine whether regulations restricting the time, place, and manner of 
speech will survive First Amendment scrutiny.120  The leading case is Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism,121 where the Court held that the regulation must be 
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech . . . 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”122  
In the 1980s, the Court acknowledged that these tests shared some common 
characteristics and began applying the Ward and O’Brien tests interchange-
ably.123  Despite the differences and distinctions between the two content-
neutral doctrines, the Court has essentially merged these doctrines.124  In 
addition to the content-neutral and content-based tests, the secondary 
effects doctrine often applies in adult entertainment cases.125 
c. Secondary Effects Test 
The secondary effects test developed with adult entertainment cases.126  
This test complicates the expressive speech analysis because it essentially 
combines the content-neutral and content-based tests.127  Under the second-
ary effects test, the ordinance may be content-based, but it is analyzed un-
der intermediate scrutiny if the goal is to combat the secondary effects of 
 
118. Id. at 376-77. 
119. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (applying a modified 
version of the O’Brien test); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (applying a 
form of the O’Brien test to a public indecency statute). 
120. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 796-97 (2007). 
121. 491 U.S. 781 (1989) 
122. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288, 293 (1984)). 
123. See Bhagwat, supra note 120, at 796-97 (explaining that the tests were used 
interchangeably); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (stating that the standards from Ward & O’Brien are 
essentially the same); Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 n.8 (combining the O’Brien test with the Ward time, 
place, or manner analysis). 
124. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass 
Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 166-72 (1995) (explaining 
that the United States Supreme Court’s tests for expressive conduct, and time, place or manner 
regulations are essentially identical and merged). 
125. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (recognizing that 
the ordinance was aimed at the “secondary effect” of crimes associated with adult theatres). 
126. See, e.g., id. (discussing the secondary effects of adult businesses); City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97 (2000) (plurality opinion) (expanding the test to illustrate the require-
ments of proof). 
127. Raban, supra note 99, at 556 (stating that the distinction between the content tests was 
clear until the secondary effects doctrine). 
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the conduct.128  Secondary effects have included increased criminal activity, 
prostitution, noise, economic vitality, property values, and street crime.129 
This test concerns some legal commentators because it changes the 
level of scrutiny for content-based laws.130  By utilizing the secondary 
effects doctrine, the courts analyze laws under a content-neutral or 
intermediate scrutiny standard.131  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme 
Court applies the secondary effects doctrine when adult businesses are 
involved.132  In addition to the level of scrutiny applied, the courts often 
analyze whether the ordinances are overbroad.133 
2. Overbroad Regulations 
Ordinances may also be found unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment if they are facially overbroad.134  Ordinances that are overly 
broad limit both protected and unprotected speech.135  However, in order for 
a court to invalidate a statute for overbreadth, the overbreadth must be 
substantial.136  The United States Supreme Court has stated that the 
overbreadth doctrine is manifestly “strong medicine,” which should be used 
sparingly and only as a last resort.137 
 
128. Id. at 556-57. 
129. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First 
Amendment Freedoms,” 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 77 (1997). 
130. Id. at 59-61.  One scholar reasons that, since all speech causes effects, the doctrine 
“eviscerates free expression by allowing government officials to characterize content-based 
regulations as content-neutral.”  Id. at 61.  Another suggests that the secondary effects test is 
utilized because public pressure influences the judge’s decision to regulate unpopular speech.  
Richard A. Posner, Comment, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 737, 741-42 (2002).  However, another commentator argues that this test weakens 
zoning power.  See Baradaran-Robison, supra note 89, at 449 (arguing that weaknesses include: 
(1) evidentiary burdens that preclude cities from experimenting with zoning solutions; (2) cities 
who must rely on “quantifiable” effects; and (3) burdening businesses that must remain viable). 
131. Hudson, supra note 129, at 60. 
132. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 297 (applying the secondary effects test to a public nudity 
ordinance); see also discussion infra Part II.F (reviewing the cases that apply the secondary effects 
doctrine in detail). 
133. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (analyzing whether an ordinance 
was overbroad). 
134. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (“The overbreadth 
doctrine prohibits the Government from banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of 
protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the process.”). 
135. Kraimer v. City of Schofield, 342 F. Supp. 2d 807, 814 (W.D. Wis. 2004). 
136. Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 
574 (1987).  The North Dakota Supreme Court provided an option to challenge the constitution-
ality of an ordinance for its potential to infringe on free speech, even though a plaintiff’s rights 
may not have been violated.  Bolinske v. N.D. State Fair Ass’n, 522 N.W.2d 426, 429-39 (N.D. 
1994). 
137. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
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The high standard required to find overbreadth is demonstrated in 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma,138 where the United States Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a statute that regulated the political party member-
ship of certain employees.139  The Court explained that, especially when 
conduct is involved, the overbreadth must be substantial.140  The majority 
rejected the argument that the statute was substantially overbroad because it 
might regulate employees expressing private political views.141  Because 
the statute applied only to clearly partisan political activity, the Court found 
this regulation acceptable and disagreed that the statute might chill 
speech.142 
Ordinances were also challenged in the state court system, and in City 
of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc.,143 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
considered overbreadth.144  In Central Avenue News, the owners of an adult 
entertainment center challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance requir-
ing them to provide the chief of police with fingerprints and prior criminal 
records of the adult center’s employees.145  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court found that this ordinance met the standard for an overbroad ordi-
nance.146  The court reasoned that there were some criminal convictions that 
would have no relation to managing an adult business center.147  Because 
some of those convictions would have no relation to the adult business 
operation, the court found the City needed to narrow the applicability of the 
ordinance.148 
In Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Association,149 the North 
Dakota Supreme Court again considered overbreadth in 1994.150  Robert 
Bolinske supported a legislative measure to create and fund an environmen-
tal and recycling fund and was informed that he needed to rent a booth at 
the fair if he intended to circulate a petition to gather the requisite number 
of signatories.151  He refused to apply for a booth and filed a lawsuit to 
 
138. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
139. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618. 
140. Id. at 616. 
141. Id. at 617-18. 
142. Id. at 618.  Moreover, the Board interpreted the statute to include everything not within 
active partisan political campaigning.  Id. at 617. 
143. 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981). 
144. Cent. Ave. News, 308 N.W.2d at 863. 
145. Id. at 862-63. 
146. Id. at 863. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. 522 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1994). 
150. Bolinske, 522 N.W.2d at 429-30. 
151. Id. at 428. 
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enjoin the fair from stopping his petition circulation.152  In Bolinske, the 
court allowed a free speech challenge even though the appellant had never 
applied to be a part of the event he was challenging.153  The court made this 
allowance because under the overbreadth doctrine, the action could be 
challenged because it had the potential to chill or infringe speech, even if it 
was not the appellant who suffered the harm.154  The court refused to hold 
that the North Dakota Constitution prohibited any regulation on public 
property.155 
In summary, when the First Amendment is implicated by conduct, the 
court must first decide whether the speech is obscenity or protected con-
duct.156  If the conduct is protected, then the court must decide whether the 
ordinance is content-neutral or content-based.157  If the ordinance is con-
tent-based, then the court will use a strict scrutiny standard.158  If the ordi-
nance is content-neutral the court may then apply the O’Brien test, the 
Ward test, the secondary effects test, or a combination thereof.159  Addition-
ally, the ordinance may always be challenged as overbroad.160  The courts 
have applied these tests in both the Twenty-First and First Amendment 
analyses.161 
E. THE HISTORY OF ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CASES: THE USE OF 
THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT BEFORE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Although courts use the First Amendment to analyze adult entertain-
ment in current cases, adult entertainment was first regulated through the 
 
152. Id. at 428-29. 
153. Id. at 429. 
154. Id. at 429-30. 
155. Id. at 437 (citing N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
156. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (explaining the obscenity test).  The 
test for obscenity is: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards,” 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether 
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
157. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (analyzing and explaining the 
difference between content-based and content-neutral ordinances). 
158. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (explaining that content-based statutes 
are analyzed under strict scrutiny). 
159. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (explaining that the Ward 
and O’Brien tests are essentially the same). 
160. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (holding that a ban 
on child pornography was overbroad because it also banned protected speech). 
161. See discussion infra Part II.E (analyzing the adult entertainment cases). 
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Twenty-First Amendment of the United States Constitution.162  Section one 
of the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the prohibition of alcohol.163  
Section two provides, “[t]he transportation or importation into any State, 
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of 
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohib-
ited.”164 Congressional legislative history indicates that the amendment was 
passed to provide dry states the power to regulate alcohol entering and 
leaving their individual states.165  Cities and municipalities have used the 
Twenty-First Amendment to justify ordinances that prohibit alcohol at 
venues where nude dancing is present.166 
In California v. LaRue,167 the United States Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a nude dancing ordinance in 1972.168  The 
ordinance in LaRue prohibited sexual acts and nudity from establishments 
licensed by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.169  In 
LaRue, the Court held that the ordinance was constitutional.170  The city 
presented evidence that suggested a connection between adult entertainment 
and criminal activity.171  The Court determined that the Twenty-First 
Amendment gave the ordinance a presumption of validity.172  The Court 
reasoned that the Twenty-First Amendment conferred additional powers on 
the states regarding the traditional police powers of public health, welfare, 
 
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.  See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972) 
(plurality opinion) (finding that the State had the power to regulate nude dancing through an 
alcohol ordinance under the Twenty-First Amendment). 
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
165. 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. John Blaine); see, e.g., McCormick & 
Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 141 (1932) (concluding that neither the Eighteenth Amendment nor 
the National Prohibition Act superseded state laws).  However, the amendment has been 
interpreted as  providing individual states additional power regarding alcohol.  LaRue, 409 U.S. at 
114. 
166. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114. 
167. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
168. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 110. 
169. Id. at 111-12.  The ordinance prohibited: 
(a) The performance of acts, or simulated acts, or “sexual intercourse, masturbation, 
sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which are prohib-
ited by law;” (b) The actual or simulated “touching, caressing or fondling on the 
breast, buttocks, anus or genitals;” (c) The actual or simulated “displaying of the pubic 
hair, anus, vulva or genitals;” (d) The permitting by a licensee of any person to remain 
in or upon the licensed premises who exposes to public view “any portion of his or her 
genitals or anus;” and, by a companion section, (e) The displaying of films or pictures 
depicting acts a live performance of which was prohibited by the regulations quoted 
above. 
Id. (citing LaRue v. State of California, 326 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (C.D. Cal. 1971)). 
170. Id. at 119. 
171. Id. at 111. 
172. Id. at 118-19. 
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and morals.173  Therefore, the State had the power to regulate the location of 
the performances, rather than the content of the performances.174  Accord-
ing to the majority, this regulation of the location did not implicate a First 
Amendment violation of freedom of expression.175  The regulation did not 
expressly forbid the performances; it only regulated the location of such 
performances.176 
The North Dakota Supreme Court relied on LaRue in Olson v. City of 
West Fargo,177 regarding a cabaret ordinance.178  The ordinance prohibited 
live performances containing any form of dancing, removal of clothing, or 
performance of certain sexual acts.179  It also required the licensee to pro-
vide identification of all performers to the West Fargo Police Depart-
ment.180  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the cabaret ordinance 
was not an unconstitutional infringement of free speech or expression 
because the Twenty-First Amendment gave the State additional police 
power.181  It also rejected the argument that the cabaret ordinance was too 
vague or irrational.182  According to the court, a reasonable person would be 
able to differentiate between the prohibited and acceptable conduct.183  
Moreover, the identification requirement was rationally intended to keep 
minors off the premises.184  Finally, it determined that West Fargo had the 
power to enact the cabaret ordinance because the North Dakota Legislature 
wanted cities to have the authority to control obscene conduct in liquor 
establishments.185 
Fifteen years later, the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
regulation of adult entertainment through the Twenty-First Amendment a 
second time in 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island186 in 1996.187  Rhode 
 
173. Id. at 114. 
174. Id. at 118. 
175. Id. at 115-16. 
176. Id.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall asserted that the ordinance legally 
allowed nightclubs to present a variety show, but if the show involved sex, it was unconstitutional.  
Id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  The classification was based on content, and the Court 
traditionally viewed those classifications with suspicion under the First Amendment standards.  Id. 
at 139. 
177. 305 N.W.2d 821 (1981). 
178. Olson, 305 N.W.2d at 822. 
179. Id. at 823. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 827. 
182. Id. at 828-30. 
183. Id. at 829. 
184. Id. at 830. 
185. Id. at 831. 
186. 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
187. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489. 
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Island liquor stores challenged a state ban on liquor price advertising 
alleging it violated their First Amendment rights.188  The State relied on 
LaRue and the power of the Twenty-First Amendment to justify the ordi-
nance.189  Nevertheless, the Court rejected its reasoning from LaRue and 
ended the line of cases which held that the Twenty-First Amendment 
essentially superseded the First Amendment.190  The Court held that the 
Twenty-First Amendment did not supersede the prohibition against laws 
abridging freedom of speech.191  Even though the Court abandoned the 
rationale in LaRue, it did not specifically question the holding that the 
ordinance in LaRue was constitutional.192  After the analysis in LaRue, the 
United States Supreme Court regulated adult entertainment ordinances 
through the First Amendment.193 
F. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT REGULATION OF 
ADULT BUSINESSES 
Many forms of adult entertainment, such as adult bookstores and movie 
theatres, did not serve alcohol on their premises and were not subject to 
liquor licenses and the Twenty-First Amendment.194  These businesses were 
regulated through the First Amendment and zoning ordinances.195  One 
decision in particular had a confusing effect on the adult entertainment 
zoning jurisprudence.196  In addition to these zoning challenges, ordinances 
were also challenged as a violation of the First Amendment.197  After the 
varied United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals adopted a test that synthesized the Supreme Court 
precedent.198 
 
188. Id. at 492-93. 
189. Id. at 515. 
190. Id. at 516; see, e.g., Olson v. City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821, 827 (1981) (holding 
the Twenty-First Amendment gave the city the power to regulate alcohol and nude dancing). 
191. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 516. 
192. Id. at 515. 
193. See discussion infra Part II.F (analyzing adult entertainment cases regulated through the 
First Amendment). 
194. Compare California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (holding that a liquor 
establishment was subject to regulation under police powers and the Twenty-First Amendment), 
with Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (challenging a zoning ordinance 
under the First Amendment where no alcohol was served). 
195. See Young, 427 U.S. at 63 (upholding a zoning ordinance to regulate property uses in a 
neighborhood with adult businesses); see also discussion infra Part II.F.1 (discussing the 
development of the secondary effects test). 
196. See discussion infra Part II.F.2 (analyzing the case law after the first zoning cases). 
197. See discussion infra Part II.F.3 (focusing on the general ordinance adult entertainment 
cases that involve nude dancing specifically). 
198. See discussion infra Part II.F.4 (explaining the new synthesized test). 
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1. Courts Approve the Use of Zoning and Develop the Secondary 
Effects Test 
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,199 Detroit, Michigan enacted 
an “Anti-Skid Row Ordinance” after discovering that certain property uses, 
some relating to adult businesses, harmed a neighborhood.200  The Court 
allowed the city council to support its ordinances with expert opinions 
about the decline in the quality of life, or the “secondary effects” in neigh-
borhoods with adult establishments.201  Even though the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from wholly suppressing sexual materials, the 
Young opinion demonstrates how the government can regulate the content 
of materials by placing them in a different classification.202 
Soon thereafter, the North Dakota Supreme Court, like the United 
States Supreme Court, upheld an ordinance regulating the zoning of an 
adult entertainment business in Central Avenue News.203  Central Avenue 
News, Inc. opened a bookstore in downtown Minot and offered sexually 
explicit written materials and booths that played explicit films.204  Central 
Avenue News, Inc. planned to open another entertainment center.205 Subse-
quently, the City of Minot enacted a $300 annual license fee in addition to a 
new zoning restriction.206  Central Avenue News, Inc. challenged the 
ordinance in court.207  Using Young’s plurality rationale, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held that Minot was within its constitutional rights under the 
First Amendment in charging a reasonable licensing fee.208  According to 
the court, the city was within its wide-reaching power to zone under the 
police powers.209 
Five months after Central Avenue News, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson,210 an adult 
 
199. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
200. Young, 427 U.S. at 54.  The harm included undesirable transients, decreasing property 
values, increasing crime, especially prostitution, and out-migration.  Id. at 55. 
201. Id. at 71-73. 
202. See id. at 70 (“[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve 
the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theatres of our choice.”). 
203. City of Minot v. Cent. Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851, 863 (1981). 
204. Id. at 855. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 855-56. 
207. Id. at 857. 
208. Id. at 861. 
209. Id. at 858-59.  “Licensing fees levied on practices or business the nature of which 
revolves around the exercise of First Amendment rights will withstand a constitutional attack only 
if they are nominal and imposed only as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing 
the activities in question.”  Id. at 859. 
210. 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981). 
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entertainment case.211  In Avalon, the Little Rock City Council discovered 
that the city’s first adult movie theatre was scheduled to open.212  Therefore, 
it enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited sexually explicit film show-
ings.213  The Eighth Circuit found the ordinance unconstitutional under the 
O’Brien factors because the ordinance was content-based and lacked justifi-
cation as a reasonable regulation of time, place, and manner of lawful 
speech.214  The Eighth Circuit also distinguished Young, where the city 
council made specific findings about the adverse effects of the entertain-
ment establishments.215  The court was suspicious about the lack of specific 
findings and the timing of the emergency ordinance, especially when 
coupled with a city alderman’s comments that he hoped the ordinance 
would prohibit the theatre from opening.216 
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,217 the United States 
Supreme Court upheld another ordinance restricting the location of adult 
entertainment movie theatres.218  Renton, Washington passed an ordinance 
that required adult theatres to be located outside residential zones.219  
Playtime Theatres, an adult movie theatre, challenged the ordinance on First 
Amendment grounds.220 
The Court recognized the difficulty in analyzing these ordinances.221  It 
reasoned that the business’ First Amendment rights were threatened when a 
municipality denied the business a reasonable opportunity to operate.222  
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the ordinance was not aimed at the 
content of the films, or at suppression of free speech, but at the secondary 
 
211. Avalon, 667 F.2d at 660.  While this case is unlikely to appear in most analyses of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, McCrothers and Berger relied on it in their arguments.  McCrothers 
Corp. v. City of Mandan, 2007 ND 28, ¶ 11, 728 N.W.2d 124, 128-29. 
212. Avalon, 667 F.2d at 660. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 662-63.  The O’Brien factors are: (1) the regulation must further an important or 
substantial governmental interest; (2) the governmental interest must be unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and (3) the restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms 
must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.  United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
215. Avalon, 667 F.2d at 661. 
216. Id. at 662-63. 
217. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
218. Renton, 475 U.S. at 43. 
219. Id. at 44. 
220. Id. at 43.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ordinance failed the O’Brien 
test because Renton relied on the experiences of other cities in supporting its rationale and failed 
to demonstrate its interests were unrelated to the suppression of expression.  Id. at 46. 
221. Id. at 47.  “At first glance, the Renton ordinance . . . does not appear to fit neatly into 
either the ‘content-based or the content-neutral’ category.”  Id. 
222. Id. at 54. 
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effects.223  The majority determined that cities and municipalities should 
have the opportunity to experiment to find solutions to the alleged prob-
lems.224  Finally, the Court found that a zoning ordinance would be upheld 
if it was intended to serve a substantial governmental interest, and did not 
restrict alternative avenues of communication.225  In the aftermath of the 
Renton decision, circuit courts continued to analyze whether ordinances 
were constitutional and interpreted the Supreme Court precedent differ-
ently.226  The Supreme Court did not address the confusion until 2002.227 
2. The Supreme Court Addresses the Confusion Surrounding 
Zoning Cases 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of adult 
entertainment in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,228 when an 
adult business challenged an ordinance that prohibited multiple adult enter-
tainment businesses in one building.229  The district court and Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held the ordinance unconstitutional under the Renton 
standard because the city failed to produce substantial evidence of the prob-
lems related to multi-level adult entertainment establishments in the same 
building.230  In the plurality opinion, five Justices agreed that the ordinance 
was unconstitutional, but used different rationales.231 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, found that the City of Los 
Angeles reasonably relied on a 1977 study.232  The city used the study to in-
fer that areas with high concentrations of adult entertainment also had high 
 
223. Id. at 53. 
224. Id. at 52. 
225. Id. at 47. 
226. See, e.g., Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that an ordinance that required arcade booths to be visible to employees was 
constitutional because it did not prohibit the activity completely); Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1533-34 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a zoning ordinance created 
too much hardship for adult businesses and was unconstitutional); Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, 
Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1258-60 (5th Cir. 1992) (relying on Renton to endorse the 
secondary effects doctrine in finding a zoning ordinance constitutional because the city council 
had considered the secondary effects). 
227. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429 (2002) (plurality 
opinion). 
228. 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (plurality opinion). 
229. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 429. 
230. Id. at 432-33. 
231. Id. at 429, 443-53. 
232. Id. at 435-36.  Justice O’Connor stated: “In Renton, we specifically refused to set such a 
high bar for municipalities that want to address merely the secondary effects of protected speech.”  
Id. at 438.  She relied on the finding in Renton, that a city may rely on evidence that is “reasonably 
believed to be relevant,” to show a connection between regulation of speech and a substantial 
governmental interest.  Id. 
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crime rates.233  The plurality also reaffirmed the power of the secondary 
effects doctrine in regulating speech. 234   
Moreover, the plurality found that a municipality must supply a 
rational basis for addressing the secondary effects, with evidence that fairly 
supports its rationale.235  The challenger must cast direct doubt “by demon-
strating that the municipality’s evidence does not support the rationale or by 
furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual findings.”236  If 
the challenger succeeds, then the burden shifts back to the municipality to 
supplement the record.237  The Court found that the challengers did not raise 
a significant issue with the study and refused to reverse the summary 
judgment.238  While these cases focused on zoning ordinances, the Supreme 
Court also addressed adult business through general nude dancing 
ordinances.239 
3. Nude Dancing and the First Amendment 
The United States Supreme Court has also faced difficulty when at-
tempting to analyze nude dancing, as a subset of adult businesses, under the 
First Amendment.240  The ordinances regulating adult entertainment may be 
in the form of zoning ordinances as previously discussed, or general ordi-
nances, such as the nude dancing ordinances.241  The Court produced two 
plurality opinions, with the Justices disagreeing with the applications and 
rationale of the First Amendment tests.242 
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,243 two adult entertainment establish-
ments from South Bend, Indiana and individual dancers brought an action 
to enjoin the enforcement of an Indiana statute.244  The statute required 
 
233. Id. at 430.  The Court found it reasonable to interpret a study on concentrations of adult 
businesses and infer the results to adult businesses located in the same building.  Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 438-39. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 439. 
238. Id. at 443. 
239. See discussion infra Part II.F.3 (addressing the general ordinance adult entertainment 
cases that involve nude dancing specifically). 
240. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283 (2000) (plurality opinion) (analyzing 
an ordinance prohibiting nudity); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 562-63 (1991) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing a statute requiring dancers to wear pasties and g-strings). 
241. Compare City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (analyzing a 
zoning ordinance) with Barnes, 501 U.S. at 562-63 (addressing a general ordinance requiring g-
strings and pasties). 
242. Erie, 529 U.S. at 277-81; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 560-61. 
243. 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
244. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 562-63. 
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dancers to wear pasties and g-strings.245  The plaintiffs alleged that the stat-
ute violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.246 
Justice Rehnquist first acknowledged that nude dancing is expressive 
conduct marginally protected by the “outer perimeters” of the First Amend-
ment.247  In his opinion, he analyzed the statute under the O’Brien fac-
tors.248  As such, Justice Rehnquist determined that: (1) the public inde-
cency statute was designed to protect the public’s health, morals, and order; 
(2) it was unrelated to the suppression of expression; (3) public nudity was 
an evil that the State had the power to prohibit; and (4) the statute was 
narrowly tailored by requiring the dancers to wear pasties.249 
Unlike Rehnquist, Justice Scalia would not subject the ordinance to any 
First Amendment analysis because the law regulated nudity and not 
dancing.250  Justice Souter wrote the final plurality opinion and agreed that 
O’Brien was the correct test.251  He asserted, however, that the secondary 
effects doctrine should be used to justify the ordinance, citing the Renton 
decision as precedent.252 
After the Barnes decision produced the three rationales, the circuit 
courts applied the standards with difficultly.253  Then, the United States 
Supreme Court decided City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.254 in 2000.255  The City 
of Erie, Pennsylvania enacted an ordinance that prohibited public nudity.256  
The owner of Kandyland, an establishment that featured nude female dan-
cers, argued that statements made by the city attorney implied that the 
ordinance was aimed at nude dancing specifically.257  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, demonstrating the confusion after the Barnes opinion, held 
 
245. Id. at 563. 
246. Id. at 564. 
247. Id. at 565-66. 
248. Id. at 566-67. 
249. Id. at 567-72. 
250. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia further disagreed with the conclusion 
that dancing is “inherently expressive.”  Id. 
251. Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). 
252. Id. at 582-87. 
253. See, e.g., Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining the 
confusion surrounding the Supreme Court cases).  The court applied the O’Brien test to an ordi-
nance that regulated the distances after acknowledging that the Supreme Court cases dealing with 
nude dancing resulted in a lack of guidance in applying the First Amendment to these cases.  Id.  
The court also determined that the appropriate test was whether the business has a reasonable 
opportunity to operate.  Id. at 557. 
254. 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
255. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 277. 
256. Id. at 282. 
257. Id. at 292.  The city attorney stated that the public nudity ban was not intended to 
apply to legitimate theater productions.  Id. 
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that the ordinance violated the First Amendment because the Supreme 
Court’s Barnes opinion did not create clear precedent for the lower courts 
to follow.258 
The United States Supreme Court, in another plurality opinion, found 
that the Erie ordinance was content-neutral and should be analyzed under 
the O’Brien test.259  Moreover, the Court determined that it would not strike 
ordinances on the basis of alleged illicit motives.260  The Court also reaf-
firmed the city’s ability to rely on evidence found in other cities about the 
negative effects adult entertainment has on the neighborhood.261  Because 
the ordinance’s goal was to combat these negative secondary effects, the 
Court ultimately accepted the rationale that the city’s goal was not to 
suppress expression.262  Erie and Alameda Books provided the most recent 
Supreme Court opinions, and the Seventh Circuit subsequently developed a 
test to synthesize the precedent.263 
4. The Seventh Circuit Test Synthesizes the United States 
Supreme Court Precedent 
Courts struggled with the Erie decision.264  In 2003, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset,265 devised a 
 
258. Id. at 285. 
259. Id. at 289-90.  If the Court had found the ordinance was related to suppression of 
expression, the ordinance would have had to meet the more stringent standard.  Id. at 289. 
260. Id. at 292.  The Court found it important that the ordinance did not prohibit nudity that 
contained an erotic message, but prohibited all nudity regardless of activity.  Id. at 290. 
261. Id. at 297.  Even though the Court reaffirmed the ability of cities to rely on other cities 
for their information, the Court in Erie found that the city had relied on its own findings.  Id. 
[T]he Council of the City of Erie, has, at various times over more than a century, ex-
pressed its findings that certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for 
profit are highly detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare,  and lead to the 
debasement of both women and men, promote violence, public intoxication, 
prostitution and other serious criminal activity. 
Id. (emphasis omitted).  
262. Id.  This demonstrated the highly deferential attitude given to the city.  Id.  The Court 
also analogized the Erie City Council’s power over its city to that of an administrative agency and 
criticized Kandyland for foregoing the opportunity to challenge the ordinance during the fact 
finding stage.  Id. at 298. 
263. See discussion infra Part II.F.4 (analyzing the new Seventh Circuit test). 
264. See, e.g., Gary v. City of Warner Robins, 311 F.3d 1334, 1336-40 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding an ordinance prohibiting nude dancers under twenty-one years of age from entering a 
non-eating establishment selling alcohol because it prohibited her entrance privileges); Giovani 
Carandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 396 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (M.D.N.C. 2005) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and 
vacated in part on other grounds, 470 F.3d 1074 (4th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the state could 
not justify the burden of suppressing erotic dancing because it prohibited nude conduct and 
entertainment); City of Elko v. Abed, 677 N.W.2d 455, 464-65 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that 
a general study refuting the secondary effects was insufficient to shift the burden back to a 
municipality). 
265. 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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test to analyze adult business and nude dancing ordinances.266  This test 
synthesizes the decisions in O’Brien, Renton, Erie, Young, and Alameda 
Books.267  In Ben’s Bar, the court held that in order for an ordinance to be 
constitutional: 
(1) [T]he State must be regulating pursuant to a legitimate 
governmental power; (2) the regulation cannot completely prohibit 
adult activity; (3) the regulation must be aimed at the negative 
secondary effects caused by adult entertainment, not suppression 
of expression; and[] (4) the regulation must serve a substantial 
governmental interest, narrowly tailored, and it must keep a 
reasonable alternative avenue of communication open.268 
Under the new test, the Seventh Circuit analyzed an ordinance that pro-
hibited the sale of alcohol at a sexually oriented business.269  Ben’s Bar 
argued that the city needed to provide reports showing the connection be-
tween alcohol, nude dancing, and secondary effects.270  The city claimed it 
was trying to reduce the adverse secondary effects from the combination of 
adult entertainment and alcohol.271 
The court held the first prong of the test, whether the State was that 
regulating with a legitimate power, was met because the regulation was 
within the city’s general police powers.272  The court explained that the next 
two prongs of the test were designed to determine the correct level of scru-
tiny to apply to the ordinance.273  The court also held that the regulations at 
issue, which prohibited only the combination of alcohol and nude dancing, 
did not completely prohibit the activity.274  Moreover, the court agreed that 
Somerset’s predominant concern was to combat the secondary effects of the 
speech.275  The analysis for the fourth factor required the court to address 
 
266. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 713.  The North Dakota Supreme Court adopted this test.  
McCrothers Corp. v. City of Mandan, 2007 ND 28, ¶ 18, 728 N.W.2d 124, 135. 
267. Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 713 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425 (2002) (plurality opinion); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (plurality 
opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976) (plurality opinion)). 
268. Id. at 722 (citations omitted). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 725. 
271. Id.  
272. Id. at 722-23. 
273. Id. at 723. 
274. Id.  This satisfies the second prong of the test, which is whether the regulation com-
pletely prohibits the activity.  Id. at 722. 
275. Id. at 723-24.  The regulation included language stating that it was not attempting to 
“restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented-materials protected by the First Amend-
ment,” but instead intended to “address[] the secondary effects of Sexually Oriented Businesses.”  
        
2008] CASE COMMENT 521 
two questions: “(1) what proposition does a city need to advance in order to 
sustain a secondary-effects ordinance”; and “(2) how much evidence is 
required to support the proposition.”276  In this case, the city’s rationale was 
that the alcohol prohibition would reduce the secondary effects that result 
from the combination of nude dancing and alcohol.277  It accepted this ra-
tionale and rejected Ben’s Bar’s argument that the city needed to complete 
its own study.278  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that the ordinance was 
constitutional.279  While there is presently a synthesized First Amendment 
test, adult entertainment cases have also been analyzed under the Fifth 
Amendment.280 
G. ADULT ENTERTAINMENT CHALLENGES UNDER THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 
In addition to the First Amendment, plaintiffs have challenged regula-
tions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.281  The Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment establishes the government’s right to take 
property from individual owners in certain situations.282  The policy behind 
the takings concept is that the government should not force individuals to 
bear public burdens, which “in all fairness and justice” should be borne by 
the public.283 
The primary issue is a factual analysis that asks whether the individual 
has been deprived of all economically viable uses of land.284  The issue 
 
Id. at 724.  This satisfies the third prong of the test, which requires that the ordinance address the 
secondary effects of the adult businesses instead of suppressing expression.  Id. at 722. 
276. Id. at 724. 
277. Id. at 725.  The city cited studies from St. Croix, Wisconsin, and the Attorney General’s 
report from Minnesota.  Id. 
278. Id.  The court also rejected the argument that the city needed to produce written records 
of the effects of alcohol in nude dancing establishments.  Id. at 725-26. 
279. See id. at 728 (“Perhaps a sober patron will find the performance less tantalizing, and 
the dancer might therefore feel less appreciated. . . .  But the First Amendment rights of each are 
not offended when the show goes on without liquor.”). 
280. See discussion infra Part II.G (analyzing the adult entertainment Fifth Amendment 
challenges). 
281. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”); N.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162, 186 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (requiring adult mini-theatres and adult arcades to conform to certain structural de-
signs); P.M. Realty & Invs., Inc. v. City of Tampa, 779 So. 2d 404, 408-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000) (finding that a zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult businesses was constitu-
tional under the Fifth Amendment); Dandy Co., Inc. v. Civil City of S. Bend, 401 N.E.2d 1380, 
1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (analyzing a zoning ordinance under the Fifth Amendment). 
282. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 
(1992) (explaining that the government may take private property). 
283. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
284. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 
(2002). 
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regarding whether the land use is advancing a public interest is a mix of 
both fact and law.285  A city or municipality has broad police powers to reg-
ulate land-usage through zoning.286  Ordinances and regulations are often 
zoning ordinances in adult entertainment cases.287  It is important to note 
that a zoning ordinance does not constitute a taking “merely because it 
diminishes the value of the regulated property or disallows the best and 
highest use of the property.”288 
The Supreme Court has identified the following situations as per se 
regulatory takings: “(1) where government requires an owner to suffer a 
permanent physical invasion of her property,” however minor; and “(2) 
where regulations completely deprive an owner of all economically bene-
ficial use[s] of [his or] her property,” which is the determinative factor.289  
If the regulation does not fall into these two narrow categories, then courts 
follow the factors set out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City290 when evaluating takings cases.291 
In Penn Central, a prominent railway terminal in New York received a 
landmark preservation designation.292  The owners were subsequently de-
nied permission to build an apartment building over the terminal.293  They 
sued, alleging that the denial of developmental opportunities constituted a 
taking.294  The United States Supreme Court developed the following test to 
determine whether there has been a taking: (1) “the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly”; (2) “the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”; and 
(3) “the character of the governmental action.”295  Under these factors, the 
 
285. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Moneterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720-21 (1999). 
286. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (upholding a municipality’s 
right to zone even when it affected landowners). 
287. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 473 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (upholding an 
adult entertainment zoning ordinance in Detroit); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 
52 (1976) (plurality opinion) (analyzing an “Anti-Skid Row” zoning ordinance that affected adult 
businesses). 
288. Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987).  It 
will constitute a taking of property for public use if the governmental regulation prohibits all or 
substantially all of the property use.  Id. 
289. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528 (2005). 
290. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
291. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537 (reviewing the Penn Central factors); Wild Rice River 
Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 2005 ND 193, ¶ 9, 705 N.W.2d 850, 856 (analyzing the Penn 
Central factors). 
292. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115. 
293. Id. at 117. 
294. Id. at 119. 
295. Id. at 124.  Under the third factor, the court explained that whether the prohibition 
amounts to a physical invasion or affects property interest through public program, it is adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.  Id. 
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Court in Penn Central held that the prohibition did not constitute a 
taking.296 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has utilized the Penn Central factors 
in its case analyses.297  The North Dakota constitutional takings provision 
has been interpreted as conferring broader property rights than the federal 
constitution.298  Article I, section 16 states, “[p]rivate property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”299  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court in Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo300 
addressed the takings issue.301  In Wild Rice, developers claimed that a mor-
atorium on building interfered with investment expectations.302  The court 
analyzed this claim using the Penn Central factors, and found that the 
investment-backed expectations were unreasonable because factors beyond 
the moratorium affected the investment.303 
Zoning ordinances that require bars to obtain special licenses have also 
been held constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.304  In SDJ, Inc. v. 
Houston,305 bar owners challenged an ordinance with an amortization provi-
sion for nonconforming uses.306  The district court and Fifth Circuit held 
that the municipality had broad police powers to restrict the use of 
property.307  Additionally, the ordinance did not prevent all reasonable uses 
of the bar owners’ property.308  More recently, an adult nightclub owner 
argued in P.M. Realty & Investment, Inc. v. City of Tampa,309 that a zoning 
ordinance constituted a taking because it suppressed access to lawful 
speech.310  Because the zoning ordinance allowed thirty-eight alternative 
categories for usage, the court refused to classify it as a taking.311  The 
 
296. Id. at 138. 
297. See Wild Rice, ¶ 12, 705 N.W.2d at 854-55 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124) 
(utilizing the Penn Central factors in its analysis). 
298. Id. ¶ 16, 705 N.W.2d at 856 (citing Grand Forks-Traill Water Users, Inc. v. Hjelle, 413 
N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1987)). 
299. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
300. 2005 ND 193, 705 N.W.2d 850. 
301. Wild Rice, ¶ 1, 705 N.W.2d at 852. 
302. Id. ¶ 21, 22, 728 N.W.2d at 857. 
303. Id. ¶ 24, 728 N.W.2d at 858-59. 
304. See SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1271-72 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring bar 
owners to obtain a permit to continue adult usage). 
305. 837 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1988). 
306. SDJ, 837 F.2d at 1272. 
307. Id. at 1271-72. 
308. Id. at 1278. 
309. 779 So. 2d 404 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
310. P.M. Realty, 779 So. 2d at 408-09. 
311. Id. 
        
524 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:495 
North Dakota Supreme Court applied this analysis to McCrothers Corp. v. 
City of Mandan312 in 2007.313 
III. ANALYSIS 
The North Dakota Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in 
McCrothers with Chief Justice VandeWalle writing for the court.314  Twen-
ty-one years after it first considered an adult entertainment ordinance in 
Olson, the McCrothers court reconsidered whether the use of the Twenty-
First Amendment was appropriate in the adult entertainment analysis.315  
The court began its analysis by reviewing the history and legal standard.316  
Then, it analyzed whether the ordinance is content-neutral or content-
based.317  The court adopted the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals test to 
analyze the constitutionality of the ordinance under the First Amend-
ment.318  The court briefly considered and dispensed with an argument that 
the ordinance constituted a regulatory taking.319  Finally, the court 
addressed the state constitutional issues.320 
A. HISTORY AND LEGAL STANDARD 
The McCrothers court began by reviewing the facts, ordinances, and 
procedural posture of the case.321  Then the court addressed the summary 
judgment standard, namely, that the question before the court is a question 
of law and not fact.322  The parties had already maintained that there were 
no disputed issues of material fact; instead, the only issues were of consti-
tutional law.323 
 
312. 2007 ND 28, 728 N.W.2d 124. 
313. See discussion infra Part III (analyzing McCrothers). 
314. McCrothers v. City of Mandan, 2007 ND 28, ¶ 1, 728 N.W.2d 124, 126. 
315. Id. ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d at 134-35 (citing Olson v. City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821, 
823 (N.D. 1981)). 
316. Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 728 N.W.2d at 126-27. 
317. Id. ¶¶ 10-16, 728 N.W.2d at 128-34. 
318. Id. ¶ 18, 728 N.W.2d at 135; see supra note 267 and accompanying text (explaining the 
Supreme Court cases that the test synthesized). 
319. Id. ¶¶ 33-35, 728 N.W.2d at 140-41.  The court only needed three paragraphs to analyze 
the Fifth Amendment issue.  Id. 
320. Id. ¶ 36, 728 N.W.2d at 141-42. 
321. Id. ¶¶ 2-6, 728 N.W.2d at 126-27. 
322. See id. ¶ 7, 728 N.W.2d at 127 (“Summary judgment is a procedural device . . . [when] 
there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from 
undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law.”). 
323. Id. ¶ 8, 728 N.W.2d at 127-28. 
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B. THE COURT REJECTED A STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD 
After reaffirming First Amendment protection for nude or semi-nude 
dancing, the court began its analysis to determine whether the ordinance 
would be judged under a strict scrutiny standard or the “less stringent stan-
dard.”324  McCrothers and Berger argued that the ordinances ought to be 
judged under strict scrutiny due to the analogous qualities of Avalon.325  
The McCrothers court distinguished Avalon for four reasons.326  First, in 
Avalon, the city council enacted an ordinance only after learning about an 
imminent adult business opening.327  Conversely, Mandan allowed adult 
entertainment to operate for years before the ordinances.328  Additionally, 
the Mandan City Council allowed public hearings and produced findings 
that were numerous and specific.329  Second, Avalon was decided before 
Renton.330  This was important to the McCrothers court.331  The court noted 
that after Renton, zoning restrictions on adult businesses were largely 
upheld.332  Third, even though Mandan city commissioners and members of 
the public disclosed their displeasure with the adult entertainment establish-
ments, the court did not believe the moral aversion constituted the predomi-
nant factor in enacting the ordinance.333  Fourth, the court concluded that 
Mandan’s main interest in enacting the ordinance was combating the 
negative secondary effects of adult establishments, which did not include an 
intention to violate the First Amendment.334  Therefore, according to the 
McCrothers court, the ordinance was properly analyzed as a content-neutral 




324. Id. ¶ 10, 728 N.W.2d at 128. 
325. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11 (citing Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 660 (8th Cir. 
1981)). 
326. Id. ¶¶  12-16, 728 N.W.2d at 129-34. 
327. Id. ¶ 12, 728 N.W.2d at 129 (citing Avalon, 667 F.2d at 661). 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. ¶ 13 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986)); 
see also Avalon, 667 F.2d at 661 (finding that the ordinance was enacted after the city learned that 
an adult theatre was opening).  The United States Supreme Court found that a city was allowed to 
rely upon other experiences, even if restricting First Amendment Rights was a motivating factor.  
Id. 
331. McCrothers, ¶ 13, 728 N.W.2d at 129-30. 
332. Id. at 130 (citing C. Crocca, Annot., Validity of Ordinances Restricting Location of 
Adult Entertainment or Sex-Oriented Businesses, 10 A.L.R. 5th 538 (1993)). 
333. Id. ¶ 16, 728 N.W.2d at 134. 
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
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C. THE COURT REPLACED THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 
ANALYSIS FROM OLSON WITH A NEW TEST 
The McCrothers court acknowledged the disseverment of the Twenty-
First Amendment analysis in cases involving alcohol and adult entertain-
ment.336  Since this analysis was abandoned, courts have struggled with the 
frameworks under which to analyze zoning and public indecency regula-
tions.337  Therefore, the court adopted a new test from the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals which was based on the O’Brien test and attempted to 
synthesize the existing Supreme Court precedent.338  Under the new test, a 
regulation is constitutional when:  
(1) the state is regulating pursuant to a legitimate governmental 
power; (2) the regulation does not completely prohibit adult enter-
tainment; (3) the regulation is aimed not at the suppression of 
expression, but rather at combating the negative secondary effects 
caused by adult entertainment establishments; and (4) the regula-
tion is designed to serve a substantial government interest, 
narrowly tailored, and reasonable alternative avenues of communi-
cation remain available; or, alternatively, the regulation furthers an 
important or substantial government interest and the restriction on 
expressive conduct is no greater than is essential in furtherance of 
that interest.339   
After the court analyzed the Seventh Circuit test, it also addressed the 
possibility of overbreadth.340 
1. First Prong Analysis—Whether the Ordinance is a Legitimate 
Governmental Regulation 
The court began its analysis by evaluating the first prong of the new 
test.341  Even though neither party disputed the legitimacy of the govern-
ment power, the court explained that the inherent police powers give states 
the ability to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages, even without relying 
on the Twenty-First Amendment.342  Furthermore, both the United States 
Supreme Court and the North Dakota Supreme Court have held that states 
 
336. Id. ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d at 134-35. 
337. Id. at 135 (citing Giovani Varandola, Ltd. v. Fox, 396 F. Supp. 2d 630, 638 (M.D.N.C. 
2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vacated in part on other grounds, 470 F.3d 1074 (4th Cir. 
2006)). 
338. Id. ¶ 18. 
339. Id. 
340. Id. ¶ 27, 728 N.W.2d at 138-39. 
341. Id. ¶ 19, 728 N.W.2d at 135-36. 
342. Id. 
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have the power to regulate in order to maintain quality of life.343  Moreover, 
a North Dakota statute provides that a local body may enact ordinances that 
will regulate alcohol licensees, including dancing or forms of entertain-
ment.344  Therefore, Mandan was regulating under a legitimate govern-
mental power; thus, the ordinance met the first prong of the new test.345 
2. Second Prong Analysis—Whether the Ordinance is a 
Complete Prohibition 
The second prong determined whether the regulation completely pro-
hibits adult entertainment.346  Because no adult entertainment businesses 
were operating in Mandan, McCrothers and Berger contended that the ordi-
nance completely prohibited adult entertainment.347  The court rejected this 
argument, primarily because the ordinances in question did not prohibit the 
establishment and operation of adult establishments.348  The ordinance only 
prohibited the location of the businesses and whether alcohol was served.349  
Furthermore, the test for “whether an adult business’ rights are threatened is 
whether the government has ‘effectively denied’ the business a ‘reasonable 
opportunity to open and operate.’”350  The reasonableness test is whether 
the business could operate, not whether the business will operate success-
fully.351  Therefore, the court concluded that McCrothers’ and Berger’s 
argument failed because the businesses had the opportunity to operate.352 
3. Third Prong Analysis—Whether the Ordinance Is Suppressing 
Expression or Combating Secondary Effects 
The court effectively analyzed the third prong earlier in the decision.353  
While determining whether the ordinance should be analyzed as a content-
neutral or content-based regulation, the court held that the City of Mandan 
had satisfied its burden of proving that it was primarily concerned with the 
 
343. Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); Olson v. 
City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1981)). 
344. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-02-09 (2007)). 
345. Id. at 136. 




350. Id.  (citing Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 557 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
351. Id. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. ¶ 13, 728 N.W.2d at 129. 
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secondary effects of adult entertainment in enacting its ordinance.354  The 
court drew from numerous indicators to affirm that Mandan’s intent was 
indeed combating secondary effects.355  Thus, the court found that Mandan 
met this prong.356 
4. Fourth Prong Analysis—Whether the Restriction is Essential 
in Furtherance of the Interest 
In the fourth prong of the analysis, the court addressed whether the 
ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, and 
whether the restriction on expressive conduct was no greater than was 
essential in furtherance of that interest.357  The court rejected McCrothers’ 
and Berger’s argument that the city failed to show a substantial govern-
mental interest.358  Instead, the court relied on Alameda Books and Renton, 
where the United States Supreme Court explicitly allowed a city to rely on 
evidence that it reasonably believed to be relevant for the connection 
between the governmental interest and speech.359 
If McCrothers and Berger had been able to establish a significant doubt 
on Mandan’s reasoning and rationale, the burden would have shifted back 
to the municipality to justify the ordinance.360  McCrothers and Berger 
argued that the many comments from the public hearing met this standard, 
but the court disagreed.361  People reported they were bothered by the noise, 
concerned that dancers came from other cities, and that the establishments 
promoted adverse images of the downtown area.362  Moreover, a former 
dancer testified that nude dancing was a front for prostitution.363  Addition-
ally, the police chief stated that thirty-eight percent of the dancers had past 
criminal convictions.364 
 
354. See generally id. ¶¶ 13-16, 728 N.W.2d at 129-34 (analyzing the content of the 
ordinance and finding it to combat secondary effects). 
355. Id. ¶ 14, 728 N.W.2d at 131.  The purpose of the ordinance was to “prevent the delete-
rious secondary effects and concentrations of adult entertainment establishments within the City.”  
MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-02.1-01 (2003).  It also stated that adult entertain-
ment establishments lead to deleterious secondary effects including sexual behavior of employees, 
sexual acts, unsanitary activities, illegal drugs, and communicable diseases.  Id. 
356. McCrothers, ¶ 16, 728 N.W.2d at 134. 
357. Id. ¶ 21, 728 N.W.2d at 137. 
358. Id. ¶ 26, 728 N.W.2d at 138. 
359. Id. ¶ 22, 728 N.W.2d at 137 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425, 435 (2002); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986)). 
360. Id. ¶ 23. 
361. Id. ¶ 24, 728 N.W.2d at 137-38. 
362. Id. at 138. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. 
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Moreover, the court rejected McCrothers’ and Berger’s reliance on an 
article that criticized the methodology of many of the studies that Mandan 
relied upon.365  Other courts refused to overturn ordinances due to critical 
commentary, and the North Dakota Supreme Court joined these courts in its 
refusal.366  The court hinted that McCrothers’ and Bergers’ arguments may 
have raised an issue of fact, but summary judgment was inappropriate to 
resolve those issues.367  The court concluded that the ordinances serve a 
substantial governmental interest, and thereafter considered McCrothers’ 
and Berger’s contention that the ordinances were overbroad and not 
narrowly tailored to the governmental interest.368 
5. Fifth Prong Analysis—Whether the Ordinance is Overbroad 
or Narrowly Tailored 
The McCrothers court noted that the United States Supreme Court 
stated that the overbreadth doctrine is “‘manifestly, strong medicine’ which 
should be used sparingly and only as a last resort.”369  McCrothers and 
Berger argued that the ordinance in its current form was overbroad because 
it could extend to cheerleaders at sporting events, dance troupes, garter auc-
tions, and bachelor and bachelorette parties.370  The court stated that be-
cause the ordinances were specific to dancing “for consideration, monetary 
or otherwise,” it did not meet the standard for overbreadth.371 
McCrothers and Berger challenged the requirement under Ordinance 
No. 964 to disclose certain criminal convictions for permit applications as 
overbroad.372  The court refused to find this ordinance overbroad, even 
though the North Dakota Supreme Court found a very similar statute 
 
365. Id. ¶ 26. 
366. Id.  (citing SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 863-64 (8th Cir. 2003); City 
of Elko v. Abed, 677 N.W.2d 455, 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)).  The cities commonly use ten 
empirical studies to justify the secondary effects of adult establishments and one scholar argues 
that these studies provide no legitimate basis for regulating adult businesses.  Paul et al., supra 
note 73, at 391. 
367. McCrothers, ¶ 26, 728 N.W.2d at 138. 
368. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27. 
369. Id. ¶ 27, 728 N.W.2d at 139 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)). 
370. Id. ¶ 28. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. ¶ 29 (citing MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-02.1-04(A)(5) (2003)).  
Ordinance No. 964 states: 
For the applicant and all applicant control persons, any and all criminal convictions or 
forfeitures within five (5) years immediately preceding the date of the application, 
other than parking offenses or minor traffic infractions including the dates of convic-
tion, nature of the crime, nature and location of court and disposition. 
Id. 
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unconstitutional in Central Avenue in 1981.373  Mandan included a time 
requirement on the ordinance and the Commission’s findings were more 
extensive than Central Avenue.374  While the court refused to overrule the 
overbreadth holding in Central Avenue, it did acknowledge that criminal 
background checks have become more common and would be relevant to a 
city trying to combat the adverse secondary effects of adult entertainment 
establishments.375  The court concluded that McCrothers’ and Berger’s First 
Amendment rights were not violated when Mandan enacted Ordinance Nos. 
961, 963, and 964.376  After the court concluded its First Amendment 
analysis, it addressed the Fifth Amendment arguments.377 
D. WHETHER THE ORDINANCES CONSTITUTED A REGULATORY 
TAKING 
In addition to the First Amendment analysis, McCrothers and Berger 
challenged that Mandan had taken their properties.378  The court relied on 
the Penn Central factors in its analysis of the regulatory taking issue.379  
McCrothers’ and Berger’s establishments decreased revenues from $66,809 
to $21,066 and $142,080 to $68,872 respectively over the same four-month 
period, before and after the ordinances.380  Nevertheless, the court refused 
to grant a taking because they were still able to operate their businesses.381  
Moreover, the court noted that the investment backed expectations were 
unlikely reasonable.382  There was a long history of zoning and general 
regulations of adult entertainment that should have provided notice to 
McCrothers and Berger.383  McCrothers and Berger also had the oppor-
tunity to relocate their businesses if they wished to continue operating with 
adult entertainment.384  The court concluded that this did not constitute a 
 
373. McCrothers, ¶¶ 30, 31, 728 N.W.2d at 140 (citing City of Minot v. Cent. Ave. News, 
Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851, 863 (N.D. 1981)). 
374. Id. ¶ 31. 
375. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 4-41-02(1), 5-02-02(8), 12-60-24(1), 15.1-13-14, 15.1-
13-23, 43-30-02.1, 50-11-02.4, 50-11-06.8, 50-11.3-01, 50-12-03.2; 54-12-20(6) (2007)). 
376. Id. ¶ 32. 
377. Id. ¶ 33. 
378. Id. 
379. See id. ¶ 34, 728 N.W.2d at 141 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (restating the Penn Central factors: (1) “the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly;” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations;” and (3) “the character of the governmental 
action”). 
380. Id. ¶ 33, 728 N.W.2d at 140. 
381. Id. ¶ 35, 728 N.W.2d at 141. 
382. Id.  
383. Id. 
384. Id. 
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taking.385  After the court concluded the takings issue, it addressed the state 
constitutional issues.386 
E. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The Court mentioned that McCrothers and Berger also challenged the 
ordinance under North Dakota constitutional provisions.387  Because 
McCrothers and Berger failed to address why the results would differ from 
the results reached under federal law, the court declined to address state 
constitutional issues.388  Therefore, the McCrothers court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment granted by the trial court for the City of Mandan.389 
IV. IMPACT 
Adult entertainment generates billions of dollars each year.390  Even so, 
communities are unlikely to welcome the industry.391  Ordinances are a tool 
that communities utilize in planning and zoning.392  Nationally, adult enter-
tainment ordinances have been struck down as unconstitutional by some 
courts.393  Therefore, in lieu of confusing United States Supreme Court 
precedent, it is important that the North Dakota Supreme Court demon-
strated its method of analysis for adult entertainment businesses.394 
 
385. Id.  The court also mentioned that other courts held similarly.  Id. (citing SDJ, Inc. v. 
City of Houston, 827 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1988); P.M. Realty & Invs., Inc. v. City of Tampa, 
779 So. 2d 404, 408-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); DiaRaimo v. City of Providence, 714 A.2d 
554, 564 (R.I. 1998)). 
386. Id. ¶ 36, 728 N.W.2d at 141-42. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. at 142. 
389. Id. ¶ 37.  
390. DeWitt, supra note 10, at 22 (stating that the adult entertainment industry has been 
estimated to make ten to fourteen billion dollars every year). 
391. David A. Thomas, Tips for Successfully Regulating Sexually Oriented Businesses, 22 
PROB. & PROP. 43, 43 (2008). 
392. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Detroit United Ry., 184 N.W. 516, 518 (Mich. 1921) 
(“[L]ocal authorities may control within reason, the use of their streets for any purpose 
whatsoever, not inconsistent with state law.”). 
393. See, e.g., Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 268 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding an 
ordinance that prohibited lewd entertainment at a liquor licensed establishment violated the First 
Amendment); Eggert Group, LLC v. Town of Harrison, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1144 (E.D. Wis. 
2005) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited the combination of nude dancing and alcohol). 
394. See McCrothers, ¶ 18, 728 N.W.2d at 135 (adopting the Seventh Circuit test); see also 
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002) (plurality opinion) (stating 
that a city may reasonably infer information from other cities’ experiences); City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding a general nudity ordinance in 
another plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-72 (1991) (plurality 
opinion) (producing three rationales in the plurality); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 47-54 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing the secondary effects test). 
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The McCrothers decision should be utilized by city planners, city 
council members, and adult business owners in North Dakota.395  By 
utilizing the court’s analysis in McCrothers, city planners can pattern ordi-
nances on those upheld in McCrothers.396  Cities should note that first and 
foremost, adult entertainment is protected by the First Amendment, and a 
city may not completely eliminate adult entertainment from its limits.397  
Moreover, as long as cities only regulate part of the business—alcohol or 
dancing—the governing court should subject the ordinance to a content-
neutral standard, which is easier to uphold than content-based ordinances.398 
Certain elements in the McCrothers decision have likely made it more 
difficult for adult entertainment to continue in its present state if new ordi-
nances are enacted.399  Under the McCrothers standard, it is significantly 
easier for cities and municipalities to depend upon traditional empirical 
studies to prove the negative impact adult entertainment establishments 
have on their cities.400  Because cities are able to rely on these negative im-
pacts of other cities, city councils may justify an ordinance with a problem 
that is not present in their cities.401  Moreover, there is no requirement for a 
city to accomplish its own study.402  Without a radical departure from prior 
precedent, the North Dakota Supreme Court will continue to respect the fact 
findings of the municipality, making it easier for the cities to enact these 
ordinances.403 
Even though the courts give great deference to municipalities, there 
remains an uncertainty.404  The ordinances in question narrowly regulate 
 
395. See McCrothers, ¶ 36, 728 N.W.2d at 142 (upholding Mandan’s ordinances).  A Minot 
group formed to pursue an ordinance prohibiting adult entertainment.  Anti-Strip Club Group Is 
Formed in Minot, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/ 
2008/01/22/news/state/147110.txt. 
396. See, e.g., MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-01-18 (2003) (providing 
language from the “Entertainment and Live Performances Upon Licensed Premises” ordinance). 
397. See, e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565-66 (stating that some nude dancing is expressive 
conduct within the “outer perimeters” of the First Amendment). 
398. Thomas, supra note 391, at 44. 
399. See McCrothers, ¶ 36, 728 N.W.2d at 140 (upholding the current ordinance so as to 
endorse the ability for cities to separate alcohol and adult entertainment as long as the ordinance 
meets the First Amendment standard). 
400. Id. 
401. Paul et al., supra note 73, at 361-62. The traditional studies often cited have been 
accomplished in cities such as Los Angeles, Houston, Detroit and Indianapolis, which have larger 
populations than most North Dakota cities, including Mandan.  Id. 
402. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986) (holding that a 
city does not need to complete its own studies as long as the studies it relies on are reasonably 
believed to be relevant). 
403. McCrothers, ¶ 25, 728 N.W.2d at 138 (refusing to accept McCrothers’ and Berger’s 
argument that the ordinance did not serve a governmental interest). 
404. See Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 714 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(discussing similar standards for public indecency, zoning, and liquor regulations). 
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dancing through an ordinance regulating liquor and zoning.405  The United 
States Supreme Court has produced different rationales, depending on the 
type of ordinance.406  It is unclear whether the North Dakota Supreme Court 
would utilize the same analysis if a statute prohibited something related, 
like nudity or lewdness.407  Additionally, because the court stated that this 
test is for the combination of alcohol and nude or semi-nude dancing, it is 
unclear whether this test would apply to another business establishment like 
an adult bookstore or adult theatre, where alcohol may or may not be 
served.408 
Adult businesses should also be on notice that they must satisfy the 
Penn Central elements to allege a taking in adult entertainment cases in 
North Dakota.409  An ordinance prohibiting the location of an adult business 
in its current zone is constitutional, as long as it provides an area for reloca-
tion and the business may still operate.410  Business owners and their inves-
tors should be aware of those implications because they are unlikely to win 
a takings argument under that assertion.411  Even if a city or municipality 
has not enacted ordinances yet, the business owners will not be able to 
approach the court and argue their investment-backed expectations were not 
met.412  Therefore, this decision will likely have a significant impact on 
both city planners and business owners.413 
V. CONCLUSION 
In McCrothers, the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted a new test 
for determining the constitutionality of adult entertainment establishment 
ordinances.414  The new test, which the court adopted from the Seventh 
Circuit is: (1) whether the government is regulating pursuant to a legitimate 
governmental power; (2) whether it prohibits adult entertainment; (3) 
whether it is aimed at secondary effects or suppression of expression; and 
 
405. See MANDAN, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-01-18 (2003) (regulating the 
combination of alcohol and nude dancing). 
406. Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 41 (upholding an ordinance regulating the location of 
adult theatres) with City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 282-83 (2000) (upholding an 
ordinance that prohibited public nudity). 
407. See McCrothers, ¶ 18, 728 N.W.2d at 135 (adopting the Seventh Circuit test to apply it 
specifically to the ordinance that restricted the combination of alcohol and nude or semi-nude 
dancing). 
408. Id. 
409. Id. ¶ 34, 728 N.W.2d at 141. 
410. Id. ¶ 35. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. 
413. See id. ¶ 18, 728 N.W.2d at 135 (adopting the Seventh Circuit test). 
414. Id. 
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(4) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored or furthers a substantial 
governmental interest.415  The court held that the ordinance was content-
neutral, did not violate the four-part test, and did not meet the standard for 
overbreadth.416  Therefore the ordinance was constitutional under the First 
Amendment.417  Additionally, the ordinance did not deprive the business 
owners of all economic uses so it did not constitute a regulatory taking.418  
Finally, the court refused to address the state constitutional issues because 
appellants did not offer any reason why the results would have differed.419 
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